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When it comes to passwords, conflicting advice can be found everywhere. Different sources give different types of advice related to
authentication. In this paper such advice is studied. First, using a sample collection of authentication advice, we observe that different
organizations’ advice is often contradictory and at odds with current research. We highlight the difficulties organizations and users
have when determining which advice is worth following. Consequently, we develop a model for identifying costs of advice. Our model
incorporates factors that affect organizations and users, including, for example, usability aspects. Similarly, we model the security
benefits brought by such advice. We then apply these models to our taxonomy of advice to indicate the potential effectiveness of
the security recommendations. We find that organizations experience fewer costs than users as a result of authentication policies.
Reassuringly, the advice our model has classified as good or bad, is in line with the NIST 2017 digital authentication guidelines.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Password security is an essential part of our online security. However, the advice and restrictions placed on passwords
have made them a source of considerable inconvenience for users [4]. Rules introduced around passwords and other
authentication procedures sometimes seem unsupported by research and their security objectives can be unclear [78].
In his 2003 book “Beyond Fear”, Schneier explains that “almost every security measure requires trade-offs. These
trade-offs might be worse usability of a system, additional financial costs or a decrease of security in another place”.
In this paper we delve deeper into the trade-offs and effects of security policies and discover whether decreases to
usability are justified by security increases.
Lampson in 2009 said that “The root cause of the problem is economics: we don’t know the costs either of getting
security or of not having it” ... “To fix this we need to measure the cost of security, and especially the time users spend
on it” [51]. Usability with security has become a subject of interest in the last few years [63][23][4].
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In particular, researchers have looked at qualifying security and usability trade-offs for different aspects of security
systems [13][39][14]. This paper will provide a methodology for the qualification of security and usability trade-offs for
authentication.
Understanding the extent of the costs to the user or organization and trading these off for the benefits is important
if we envision a user and organization as having a fixed amount of effort they are willing to exert for their security
[9]. Wasting a large amount of this compliance budget with advice that is high cost and low impact means other
advice with more effective benefits might get pushed aside. This research highlights the often-hidden usability costs of
authentication security policies.
In this paper we build on the work introduced in our 2017 conference paper [58]. Previously, we collected security
advice and discussed a method of categorizing this advice. We also introduced a provisional structure for identifying
categories of costs. In this paper we create full cost and benefit models which can be used to evaluate any authentication
advice. We use these models to evaluate 276 pieces of authentication advice we collected. We discuss the trade-off
which takes place between the costs and the benefits for each piece of advice and offer insight into the general trends in
the costs and benefits of authentication policies.
In Section 3 we describe our method for collecting authentication advice, the categorization of the advice and our
method for representing the advice in tables. In Section 4 we define our method for identifying the costs associated with
implementing authentication advice. Section 5 outlines our model of the benefits of authentication advice. Section 6
discusses the costs and benefits for our worked examples. In this section, we also identify patterns and traits in the costs
and benefits identified. In Appendix A we provide descriptions of the assignment of costs and benefits to each advice
statement and detail the relationships between collected advice and research literature. We supply more information on
the characteristics of the advice and the costs and benefits of each advice statement in our GitHub repository [57].
2 RELATEDWORK
Research into other areas of authentication security are also being conducted. Researchers are interested in; guessing
password [47], password reuse [74] [34] and alternatives to passwords [12] [71].
Authentication policies place a large burden on users and organizations [42]. In the aptly titled paper “The true
cost of unusable password policies: password use in the wild” Inglesant and Sasse [42] find that users are generally
concerned with maintaining security, but that while an organization or user may want to enforce strong security, if the
time and monetary constraints are too high then it might not be feasible. Adams and Sasse [4] find that low motivation
and poor understanding of the threats lead users to circumvent password security policies. Beautement et al. find that
bypassing security policies is a widely employed practice [9]. They introduce the idea of a compliance budget, which
formalizes the understanding that users and organizations do not have unlimited capacity to follow new instructions
and advice.
Cormac Herley [39] argues that a users’ rejections of security advice is rational from an economic perspective.
Herley quantifies the costs versus benefits for three specific authentication guidelines: password rules, phishing site
identification advice and SSL certificate warnings. Braz et al. [14] propose a usability inspection method which can be
used to compare the security problem to the usability criteria for online tasks such as; authenticate yourself, transfer
funds or buy a concert ticket.
Shay and Bertino [68] and Arnell et al. [6] have built simulations to model the costs versus the benefits of a password
policy with complexity rules, throttling and regular expiry. They hope to help organizations to determine the trade-offs
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between the user and organization costs and the security improvements of complexity rules. Shay and Bertino explain
that security is an economic as well as a computer problem.
We expand on these works by defining a formal approach to identifying costs and benefits of security advice. This
allows us to identify costs and benefits for all classes of security advice.
3 COLLECTION AND CATEGORIZATION OF PASSWORD ADVICE
In our previous work we detail the collection of password advice [58] which we will briefly review as this work builds
upon it. We collected 276 pieces of authentication advice from 21 different sources. We primarily used Internet searches
to collect password advice but also looked at advice given by standards agencies and multinational companies. We
attempted to recreate the actions an individual or organization might take when seeking to inform themselves about
proper password practices.
An interesting application of our work is the simplification of visualizing the costs and benefits of password advice.
This can be applied to other advice we know is implemented that was not collected in our survey. Out of curiosity
we added “Do not allow users to paste passwords”. This has been discussed online as a piece of bad advice which
unfortunately became common practice, but has no discernible security ramifications [41].
When collecting the advice, we systematically created categories and allocated each piece of advice to a category.
For example, every piece of advice that mentioned changing stored passwords we placed under the category “Password
Expiry”. Within each category we had anywhere from 1 to 39 pieces of advice. The categories are broad and serve to
organize the advice thematically.
To extract an insight into the views and opinions we created over-arching statements to describe the different views
of the advice within each category. For example, the category “Expiry” contains 27 pieces of advice. Five encourage
organizations to store previous user passwords to prevent cycling through previous passwords; twelve relate to periodic
password changes; and ten tell users and organizations to change passwords if they suspect compromise. Therefore
the category “Expiry” contains three advice statements: (1) Store password history to eliminate reuse, (2) Change your
password regularly, (3) Change password if compromise is suspected.
Then, for each of these advice statements we compare them to the individual pieces of advice. For example, below
are the twelve pieces of advice under the statement “Change your password regularly”:
(1) Passwords should be changed periodically.
(2) Enforce a Maximum Password Age, users should change passwords regularly.
(3) Change your password regularly.
(4) Have a minimum Password Age. This will prevent users from bypassing the password expiry system by entering
a new password and then changing it right back to the old one.
(5) Password expiration should be enforced on all accounts.
(6) Change your passwords regularly (every 45 to 90 days).
(7) All user-level passwords must be changed at least every six months.
(8) All system-level passwords must be changed on at least a quarterly basis.
(1) *The routine changing of passwords is not recommended.
(2) *Don’t change your passwords, unless you suspect they’ve been compromised.
(3) *Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically).
(4) *Normally, there should be no reason to change your password or PIN.
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We can see the first eight pieces of advice fit under this category because they encourage users or organizations to
enforce periodic password changes. The last four pieces of advice also belong in this category because they disagree
with periodic password changes. We chose to display it in this way as it highlights the contradictions in the advice
circulated. This gives an insight into why organizations and users might have so much trouble following authentication
recommendations.
3.1 Representation of advice in tables
For clarity we split the advice into two separate tables: advice to users (Table 2) and advice to organizations (Table 3).
These are shown at the end of Section 4. Between the two tables we show all 79 of our curated advice statements.
Splitting the advice statements by user or organization made it easier for us to understand the intent of our created
advice statements. For simplicity we did not split advice between categories or separate the advice within a single
category between the two tables. In the cases where the advice is not perfectly suited to the partition, we make note of
it in our discussions. For the most part the split gives us a good overview.
The first column of Table 2 and Table 3 show the heading categories with the statements relating to them underneath.
In the second and third column of the tables we show how many pieces of advice support that advice statement, and
how many pieces of advice contradict the advice statement. As we observed in [58] there are a considerable number of
advice statements with both assenting and dissenting pieces of advice.
We use an asterisk, *, to denote a statement which is contradicted by a separate statement in the category. For
example, “Never reuse a password” does not have advice within the statement that contradicts it. However, the third
statement “Don’t reuse certain passwords” is a contradiction of never reusing passwords.
4 COSTS MODEL
In this section we describe our methodology for the creation of our costs model. We began with a brainstorming exercise.
At the heart of it was a conscious consideration for the usability costs; costs which are often-overlooked when security
policies are implemented [23]. Table 1 shows our finalized cost categories.
4.1 Identification of Cost Categories
In our previous paper [58] we presented a preliminary categorization of costs. Here we present our refined categorization
of costs and the methods used to derive it.
For each piece of advice, we considered any costs that we could think of that related to its implementation. We viewed
costs as any burdens on the user who must follow the advice, or any burdens on the organization who must either
follow or enforce the advice. Figure 1 shows two examples of this brainstorming exercise for the advice statements
“Must not match account information” and “Store [password] history to eliminate reuse”. After analyzing the 79 advice
statements in this way we had identified 10 costs.
4.2 Refining cost categories
These gave us our initial categorization of what costs come into play when an organization or user wishes to obey
or enforce password advice [58]. We then went through a process of refining these categories. In the following
subsections, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, we explain the process of finalizing these cost categories. Our final set of costs
categories are shown in Table 1.
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Must not match
account information
Increased computing
power for verifier
Inconveniences use of a
personal system for
password generation
∼ Increases risk of
forgetting
∼ Need to pick a new
password
Organizations’ time
taken to program.
(a) Personal Information: Must not match account informa-
tion
Store history to
eliminate reuse
Increased organization
computing power
Creates an additional
security hole
Increased risk of
forgetting
Possible multiple
attempts until a valid
password is chosen
Organizations’ time
taken to program
Need to pick a new
password
(b) Expiry: Store history to eliminate reuse
Fig. 1. Identifying costs for advice statements.
4.2.1 Sub-costs. We notice that some categories are outcomes of others. For example, increased risk of forgetting is
an obvious outcome of needing to pick a new password. Similarly, many categories can be seen to have “sub-costs”
which we have not explicitly listed in our categories. For example, increased risk of users abandoning site and increased
number of password resets are sub-costs of increased risk of forgetting. To minimize overlap we chose the highest-level
categories that could occur without being a sub-cost. For example, user time remained as a distinct category as at times
we recognize that there is no cost other than the users’ time. Whereas, we removed the category possible multiple
attempts to choose a valid password as it never occurred other than as a sub-cost of need to pick a new password.
4.2.2 Removal of cost categories. Three of our cost categories did not relate to our definition of costs as burdens on
the user of organization. These were: creates an additional security hole, reduced search space for attacker guessing, and
impossible to enforce.
Creates an additional security hole refers to advice that while it may protect against one thing, opens up another
avenue of attack. For example, offering to display the password at login makes it easier for the user to enter the password
correctly but increases the chance of a shoulder surfing attack.
Placing a restriction on the maximum number of characters allowed in a password is an example of advice which
could reduce the search space for an attacker guessing. For example, if only eight-character passwords are allowed then
an attacker has a smaller search space.
Both of these categories relate more to the chance of attacks occurring than to particular burdens on the user or
organization. Therefore, we consider both of them in light of the benefits rather than costs. Benefits of password advice
are discussed in Section 5.
Impossible to enforce refers to any advice that an organization distributes but cannot enforce. This can lead to an
illusion of higher security than actually exists. The term ‘security theatre’ was coined in 2003 by Bruce Schneier [16]
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Table 1. Finalized cost categories.
Organization Costs
Organizations’ time taken to enforce/implement
Increased computing power needed
Additional resources needed
User Costs
User time or inconvenience
Increased computing power needed
Additional resources needed
Increased risk of forgetting
Inconveniences use of a personal system for password generation
Need to pick a new password
and could apply here. The organization may feel they are secure with multiple authentication procedures in place. But
if these are in no way enforceable then they have little guarantee of any improvement to security.
A piece of advice that is Impossible to enforce only has costs and benefits if it is voluntarily followed. An interesting
question is; what is the probability optional advice such as this is followed, and what is the impact of user education on
its uptake? As impossible to enforce has an impact on the costs and benefits we introduce a symbol to make note of it in
our table. In Table 2 and Table 3 it is identified by an underline, such as:  . We remove it as a cost category as it does
not necessarily introduce a ‘burden’ on either the user or the organization.
4.2.3 Additional cost categories. There was one cost which when we looked back we noticed we had overlooked. It
was the cost of additional resources that might be needed by the user or the organization in order to follow the advice.
The prime example of this is two factor authentication which might require a specialized USB device or token. We
included this need for additional resources as an additional item in our list of costs.
4.2.4 User versus organization costs. Analyzing the cost categories, we wanted some way to distinguish between costs
borne by the user and costs borne by the organization. We believe it would be interesting to know who bears most of
the costs; the user or the organization. In addition, what might be a small cost for an organization could be a large
cost for a user. We therefore separated cost categories to be user and organisation specific e.g. user computing power
separate from organization computing power.
4.3 Representation of password advice costs in tables
We validated these changes to the cost categories from [58] by verifying that they incorporated all our previously
identified costs. Using only these nine cost categories we again tried to identify the costs for each of our 79 advice
statements. An indication that the model was not working was if a piece of advice had a cost which could not be
described in the model.
The output of this exercise is shown in Table 2 and Table 3. In this section we describe the notation used in our
tables and the reasons why it was chosen. In Appendix A we provide rationale for why certain costs were linked to
certain advice. Sometimes costs are not immediately obvious as outcomes of advice. Additional information building on
Appendix A is provided in [57].
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4.3.1 Minor costs. In our analysis we acknowledged the need to distinguish the extent to which a cost occurs. For
example, both “Enforce restrictions on characters in passwords” and “Make digital and physical back ups” require
organization time. But very little organization time is needed to enforce a composition restriction and a lot of effort is
needed to digitally and physically back up work. It is not within the scope of this model to have a full grading of the
costs, but we do acknowledge a difference between small or partially felt costs and more substantial costs. In our tables
a minor cost is identified as #, and a more substantial cost is identified as  .
4.3.2 Periodic costs. We also notice that advice such as “Make digital and physical back ups” and “Keep email up-to-date
and secure” require continued action. This significantly increases the costs. We acknowledge three types of costs: once
off costs usually relating to setup or account creation, costs which occur at every login and periodic costs which occur
repeatedly over different time frames. To identify these costs, we use a super-scripted symbol. Costs at login are denoted
by an at symbol:  @ and periodic costs are denoted by a sun:  ☼.
4.3.3 Positive costs. Finally, some pieces of advice reduced the burden on the organization or user. These pieces of
advice we acknowledge as ‘positive costs’ and as such they are represented with the positive symbol: +. We still wish to
note that some of these positive costs only occur when the advice is acted on voluntarily by users. Therefore, in this
situation, the symbol becomes: +.
4.4 Example
The full results of this analysis is shown in Table 2 and Table 3. As mentioned, the rationale behind the assignment of
costs is described in Appendix A.
Below we will give a fully worked example for one advice statement: “throttle password guesses”. Eight pieces
of advice that we collected encouraged organizations to throttle password guesses and we collected no advice that
contradicted it. We explain the entry found in Table 3 corresponding to this advice statement.
Throttling password guesses means to limit the number of wrong guesses that can be made against a user’s account.
For example, without throttling an attacker whowants to access an account admin@org can guess ‘Password’, ‘PassWord’,
‘P@ssw0rd’, ‘PASSWORD’ etc., indefinitely until a successful guess is made. Throttling could limit the number of
guesses to a static number and lock the account for 24 hours when that number is reached, or until it is unlocked by
an admin. Alternatively throttling could increase the amount of time that must elapse between wrong guesses. For
example, after a first wrong guess the user must wait 10 seconds before making a second guess, and if the second guess
is also wrong then 30 seconds must pass before a third guess can be made, and so forth.
The main cost of throttling is that a legitimate user could be locked out of their account if they mistype or forget
their password a certain number of times. Brostoff and Sasse [15] found that with a three strike system 31% of users are
unfairly locked out and with a 10 strike system 10% of users are unfairly locked out.
Therefore, we mark this as a minor cost to the user’s time or inconvenience that could potentially occur at every
login #@. It will also take organization time to implement the throttling method  . Finally, we assign a minor cost
to increased organization computing power needed #. Checking that no more than the allowed number of guesses are
carried out will require computing power. However, the organization will also save computing power by not needing to
compute infinitely many password checks against a users’ account when an attacker is brute force checking password
guesses. Therefore, this is marked as a minor cost as one may balance out the other.
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Table 2. Costs of implementing password advice: Advice to users.
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Backup password options
Email up-to-date and secure 0 3  ☼
Security answers difficult to guess 0 3   
Do not store hints 0 2  
Composition
Must include special characters 5 7 # #   
Don’t repeat characters 0 3 # #  #
Enforce restrictions on characters 1 12 # #   
Keep your account safe
Check web pages for SSL 0 1  ☼
Manually type URLs 0 1  ☼
Don’t open emails from strangers 0 1  ☼
Keep software updated 0 2  ☼  ☼ #
Keep anti virus updated 0 2  ☼  ☼  
Log out of public computers 0 2  @  
Password protect your phone 0 1  @  
Multi factor authentication
Use multi-factor authentication 0 1  #@   @ #@  
Use 2 step verification on phone 0 1  #@  @ #@  
Use for remote accounts 0 1  #@ # #@ #@ #
Password managers
Use a password manager 1 3 +@ #  +
Create long random password 0 1 # # # #
Personal Information
Don’t include personal information 1 5  # #   
Must not match account details 0 8  #   
Do not include names 1 8  #   
Personal password storage
Don’t leave in plain sight 0 4 #@ #
Don’t store in a computer file 1 2 #@ #
Write down safely 1 6 #@ +
Don’t choose “remember me” 0 3 #@ #
Phrases
Don’t use patterns 0 6  #   
Blacklist common passwords 0 2  #   
Take initials of a phrase 0 4   
Don’t use published phrases 1 2  #   
Substitute symbols for letters 1 2   
Don’t use words 0 16  #   
Insert random numbers and symbols 1 4   
Reuse
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Never reuse a password *5 6  ☼  ☼
Alter and reuse passwords 3 3 #☼ #☼ #☼
Don’t reuse certain passwords. 0 5  ☼ #☼
Sharing
Never share your password 0 3   
Don’t send passwords by email 0 3 # #
Don’t give passwords over phone 0 1 # #
Username
Enforce restrictions on characters 0 1 # #   
Don’t reuse username 0 1    , filled circle: major cost #, empty circle: minor cost +, plus: positive cost
@, superscript @: cost occurs at each login ☼, superscript ☼: cost occurs periodically
, underline: advice is impossible to enforce; it must be followed voluntarily or in a certain way.
Table 3. Costs of implementing password advice: Advice to Organizations.
Costs
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Administrator accounts
Not for everyday use 0 1 #  
Must have it’s own password 0 2  #@  @  
Should have extra protection 0 2  
Backup work
Make digital & physical back-ups 0 1  ☼  ☼
Default passwords
Change all default passwords 0 4  ☼ #☼
Expiry
Store history to eliminate reuse 0 5  #  
Change your password regularly 4 8  ☼ #☼   ☼
Change if suspect compromise 0 10  #  
Generated passwords
Use random bit generator *2 2  #
Must aid memory retention 0 2  +
Must be issued immediately 0 1  #
Distribute in a sealed envelope 0 1  
Only valid for first login 0 1   
Individual accounts
One account per user 0 4  #@ # #@
Each account password protected 0 3  #@  @  
Input
Don’t perform truncation 0 1 #@
Accept all characters 1 1  #@ +
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Keep accounts safe
Implement Defense in Depth 0 2  
Implement Technical Defenses 0 1   
Apply access control systems 0 1  #
Monitor and analyze intrusions 0 1  #☼
Regularly apply security patches 0 1   ☼
Length
Minimum password length 0 13 # #   
Enforce maximum length (<40) 1 3 # #  
Network: Community strings
Don’t define as standard defaults 0 1  ☼  ☼
Different to login password 0 1   
Password Cracking
Attempt to crack passwords 0 1   ☼ #☼
Policies
Establish clear policies 0 2  
Shoulder surfing
Offer to display password 0 1  #@ + +
Enter your password discretely 0 2 #@
Storage
Encrypt password files 0 1  #@ #@
Restrict access to password files 0 2   
Store password hashes 0 4  #@ #
Encrypt passwords *4 7  #@
Don’t hardcode passwords 0 1  #
Throttling
Throttle password guesses 0 8  # #@
Transmitting passwords
Don’t transmit in cleartext 0 4  #@
Request over a protected channel 0 2  #@ #@
Don’t allow users to paste passwords   @   # , filled circle: major cost #, empty circle: minor cost +, plus: positive cost
@, superscript @: cost occurs at each login ☼, superscript ☼: cost occurs periodically
, underline: advice is impossible to enforce; it must be followed voluntarily or in a certain way.
5 BENEFITS MODEL
Now we ask the questions: What are the benefits of this advice? What goal is the advice trying to achieve? From our
analysis of costs, it is evident that advice is generally not attempting to make authentication more usable. It is our
understanding that it is trying to improve security. In this section we give a method to identify such improvements,
which we call benefits.
5.1 Defining Benefit Categories
It is broadly believed that advice is attempting to guide the creation of robust authentication systems with the goal
of preventing unauthorized access to an account or to data [6][29][39][68]. This is what we define as the goal of the
advice. Therefore, the benefit of a piece of advice is the affect it has towards achieving this goal.
Unauthorized access has many avenues and one piece of advice is unlikely to protect against them all. For example,
requiring passwords of length 12 might help against a password guessing attack, but will do nothing to protect against
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phishing. In order to represent how ‘beneficial’ a piece of advice is, we would like to know in which ways the piece of
advice protects against unauthorized access, if at all.
To this end, we require a concise list of the different methods an adversary could use to gain access to a protected
account. The NIST 2017 Digital Identity Guidelines [35] document includes a table of “Authenticator Threats”. Given
that this NIST 2017 authentication document has been a highly regarded [22] and thoroughly researched document
we accept these as a concise list of the attack vectors against authentication. Below, in our Table 4, we list the attacks
from Table 8-1 in the Authentication and Lifecycle Management volume of the NIST 2017 Digital Identity Guidelines.
Included is the name, details and example for each different attack type. In places we diverge slightly from the official
description and/or example provided in the NIST document and instead indicate our interpretation of the threat.
We then considered the threats addressed by our advice statements. All the threats mitigated or created by each
piece of advice fit under these 11 categories, except the threat mitigated by “Log out of public computers”. If a user does
not log out of a public computer then the only protection a user has is the moral compass of the next person who uses
that computer. In this way a user’s account can already be thought of as in a state of compromise. It was not obvious
which of the 11 NIST categories this opportunistic attack comes under. As a stopgap we placed it as Eavesdropping.
5.2 Identifying Benefits of password advice
As with costs, which could be larger or smaller, the benefits provided by different advice also vary. The benefits of
advice therefore should reflect the probability of each attack being successful. Given some baseline chance of each
attack, we reflect on whether a piece of advice increases or decreases the chance that that attack is successful. We show
the result of this analysis for our 79 advice statements in Table 5 and Table 6.
Throughout our table we mark each piece of advice as either increasing or decreasing the chance of compromise.
However, there is an interesting question about what baseline the advice increases or decreases the chance of compromise
relative to. We describe two mechanisms for determining this baseline.
We first thought of the baseline as being a passive version of the advice. For example, if the advice is: “Email up-to-date
and secure” or “Encrypt passwords” then the baseline we measure the improvements from is doing nothing. This made
sense for a lot of the advice statements, but not all. For example, the advice “Do not store hints” is already a passive
action, but we do not want to measure its affects against itself.
Our second consideration for the baseline was the opposite of what the advice stated. For example, for the advice “do
not store hints” we consider the difference in attack threat between this and “do store hints”. Or maybe less strictly,
“you are allowed to store hints”.
We have chosen to use this ‘opposite’ method as it appears the logical comparison for most pieces of advice. The
downside is that the opposite can, in a few cases, be too ‘strict’. For example, the opposite of “do not include names”
and “don’t repeat characters” are “include names” and “repeat characters” respectively, both unnatural pieces of advice.
Two pieces of advice had ambiguous opposites. The opposite of “write down safely” could either be “don’t write down”
or “write down, but not safely”. In this case, we chose to consider the opposite as “don’t write down”. Similarly, we
choose the opposite of “alter and reuse passwords” to be that reuse is allowed even without altering.
As said, for our purposes in this paper we identify the increase or decrease in the chance of attack by comparing
to the opposite of the specific piece of advice. However, in a real-world situation a proposed policy could simply be
compared in light of the former policy in place. In this case if should be relatively easy to determine whether there are
increases or decreases in security from the previous policy.
No matter what baseline method is chosen the discussions in Appendix A and [57] should be relevant.
Manuscript submitted to ACM
12 Hazel Murray and David Malone
Table 4. Attack types on authentication
Attack type Description Examples
Assertion manufacture or
modification
The assertion is used to communicate the result
of the authentication process from the verifier to
the Relying Party (RP). The verifier and the RP
may be the same entity, or separate entities.
Use of assertion replay to impersonate a valid
user or leakage of assertion information through
the browser [70].
Physical theft A physical authenticator or physical device used
in the authentication process is stolen by an at-
tacker.
A hardware cryptographic key (e.g. a USB au-
thenticator), a phone, computer or one-time-
password device is stolen.
Duplication The subscriber’s authenticator has been copied
with or without their knowledge.
Passwords or private key written on paper or
stored in an electronic file are copied. A counter-
feit biometric authenticator is manufactured.
Eavesdropping The authenticator secret or authenticator output
is revealed to the attacker as the subscriber is
authenticating.
Passwords are physically observed during key-
board entry or intercepted by keystroke logging
software or recorded during transmission or via
network packet sniffing.
Offline Cracking An offline guessing attack is an analytical guess-
ing attack by an attacker, it requires little to no
communication with the system under attack.
A dataset of passwords or keys which are hashed
and salted or encrypted are made available to an
attacker (leaked). Using a dictionary or brute
force guessing method the attacker attempts to
guess the plaintext values of these protected se-
crets.
Side Channel Attack This attack leverages an aspect of the implemen-
tation of the computer system or security device.
An attacker exploits information about a cryp-
tographic key gathered from power, timing or
audio data.
Phishing or Pharming Fooling the subscriber into thinking the attacker
is a verifier. Phishing: electronic communication
masquerading as the verifier. Pharming: direct-
ing a website’s traffic to a masquerading fake
site.
A password or key is revealed by a bank sub-
scriber in response to an email inquiry from a
phisher pretending to represent the bank. A pass-
word is revealed by the subscriber at a fake veri-
fier website reached through DNS spoofing. [18]
[5]
Social Engineering The attacker establishes a level of trust with a
subscriber in order to convince the subscriber to
reveal their authenticator secret or authenticator
output.
An attacker masquerading as a system adminis-
trator makes a telephone inquiry requesting the
victim’s password. Attacker convinces mobile
operator to redirect the victim’s mobile phone
messages to the attacker.
Online Guessing The attacker connects to the online server of the
verifier and attempts to guess the valid authenti-
cator output for one or multiple users.
An attacker who knows the usernames for all
the accounts guesses the top ten most popular
passwords in order to try to access them. An
attacker who knows neither the username nor
password guesses combination of both to try to
unlock the account.
Endpoint Compromise Malicious code on the endpoint authenticates
without the victim’s consent, compromises the
authenticator or causes authentication to other
than the intended verifier.
Malicious code can steal data from the users’
device. Malicious code can be used to conduct
man-in-the-middle attacks on all connections.
New trusted certificates can be installed on the
users’ device.
Unauthorized binding An attacker is able to cause an authenticator
under their control to be bound to a subscriber’s
account.
Forcing a password reset to change password to
one the attacker knows. Accessing the password
file and changing the password (or other authen-
ticator) bound to the user’s account. Creation of
a second USB or linking another authentication
method to a user’s account.
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5.3 Representation of password advice benefits in tables
We use the symbols ⇑ and ⇓ to indicate an increase or decrease respectively in the probability of success for the
attack type. ↑ and ↓ indicate less significant increases or decreases in the probabilities of success for the attacks. An
underline, , indicates that the improvement is not directly enforceable. This could be because it is too vague and
therefore there is ambiguity on how an organization or user might follow it. Or simply that it is impossible for an
organization to bind their users to following the advice.
In Appendix A we include explanations for why we believe the chances of certain attacks are impacted by the advice.
Table 5. Benefits of implementing password advice: Advice to Users.
Attack Types
#
Ag
ai
ns
t
#
Su
pp
or
tin
g
As
se
rti
on
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
or
M
od
ifi
ca
tio
n
Ph
ys
ic
al
Th
ef
t
D
up
lic
at
io
n
Ea
ve
sd
ro
pp
in
g
O
ffl
in
e
Gu
es
sin
g
A
tta
ck
s
Si
de
Ch
an
ne
lA
tta
ck
Ph
ish
in
g
or
Ph
ar
m
in
g
So
ci
al
En
gi
ne
er
in
g
O
nl
in
e
Gu
es
sin
g
En
dp
oi
nt
Co
m
pr
om
ise
Un
au
th
or
iz
ed
bi
nd
in
g
Backup password options
Email up-to-date and secure 0 3 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Security answers difficult to guess 0 3 ↓
Do not store hints 0 2 ⇓ ↓ ⇓
Composition
Must include special characters 5 7 ⇓ ⇓
Don’t repeat characters 0 3 ⇓ ⇓
Enforce restrictions on characters 1 12 ↓ ↓
Keep your account safe
Check web pages for SSL 0 1 ⇓ ⇓
Manually type URLs 0 1 ⇑ ⇓
Don’t open emails from strangers 0 1 ⇓ ⇓
Keep software updated 0 2 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Keep anti virus updated 0 2 ⇓
Log out of public computers 0 2 ⇓
Password protect your phone. 0 1 ⇓
Multi factor authentication
Use multi factor authentication 0 1 ↑ ⇓ ⇓
Use 2 step verification on phone. 0 1 ↑ ↑ ↑ ⇓ ⇓ ↑
Use for remote accounts 0 1 ↑ ⇑ ⇓ ⇓
Password managers
Use a password manager 1 2 ⇑
Create long random passwords 0 1 ⇓ ⇓
Personal Information
Don’t include personal information 1 5 ⇓ ⇓
Must not match account details 0 8 ⇓ ⇓
Do not include names 1 6 ⇓ ⇓
Personal password storage
Don’t leave in plain sight 0 4 ⇓
Don’t store in a computer file 1 2 ⇓
Write down safely 1 6 ↑ ↑
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Don’t choose "remember me" 0 3 ⇓
Phrases
Don’t use patterns 0 6 ⇓ ⇓
Blacklist common passwords 0 2 ⇓ ⇓
Take initials of a phrase 0 4 ⇓ ⇓
Don’t use published phrases 1 2 ⇓ ⇓
Substitute symbols for letters 1 2 ⇓ ⇓
Don’t use words 0 16 ⇓ ⇓
Insert random numbers and symbols 1 4 ⇓ ⇓
Reuse
Never reuse a password *5 6 ⇓ ⇓
Alter and reuse passwords 3 3 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
Don’t reuse certain passwords 0 5 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
Sharing
Never share your password 0 9 ⇓ ⇓
Don’t send passwords by email 0 3 ⇓ ⇓
Don’t give passwords over phone 0 1 ⇓ ⇓
Username
Enforce composition restrictions 0 1 ⇓
Don’t reuse username 0 1 ↓ ⇓
⇓ Decreases the probability of attack. ⇑ Increases the probability of attack.
↑ Minorly increases the probability of attack. ↓ Minorly decreases the probability of attack.
, underline: advice is impossible to enforce; it must be followed voluntarily or in a certain way.
Table 6. Benefits of implementing password advice: Advice to Organizations.
Attack Types
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Administrator accounts
Not for everyday use 0 1 ⇓ ⇓
Must have it’s own password 0 2 ⇓ ⇓
Should have extra protection 0 2 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Backup work
Make digital & physical back-ups. 0 1 ↑
Default passwords
Change all default passwords. 0 4 ⇓
Expiry
Store history to eliminate reuse 0 5 ⇑ ⇓ ⇓
Change your password regularly 4 8 ↓ ↓
Change if suspect compromise 0 10 ⇓ ⇓
Generated passwords
Use random bit generator *2 2 ⇓ ⇓
Must aid memory retention 0 2 ⇑ ⇑
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Must be issued immediately 0 1 ⇓
Distribute in a sealed envelope 0 1 ⇑ ↑ ⇓
Only valid for first login 0 1 ⇓
Individual accounts
One account per user 0 4 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Each account password protected 0 3 ⇓ ↓ ⇓
Input
Don’t perform truncation 0 1 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Accept all characters 1 1 ⇓ ⇓ ↓
Keep accounts safe
Implement Defense in Depth 0 2 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Implement Technical Defenses 0 1 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Apply access control systems 0 1 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Monitor and analyse intrusions 0 1 ⇓ ↓ ↓ ⇓ ⇓
Regularly apply security patches 0 1 ↓ ↓ ⇓ ↓
Length
Minimum password length 0 13 ⇓ ⇓
Enforce maximum length (<40) 1 3 ⇑ ⇑ ⇑
Network: Community strings
Don’t define as standard default 0 1 ⇓
Different to login password 0 1 ⇓ ⇓
Password Cracking
Attempt to crack passwords 0 1 ⇓
Policies
Establish clear policies 0 2
Shoulder surfing
Offer to display password 0 1 ⇑
Enter your password discretely 0 2 ⇓
Storage
Encrypt password files 0 1 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Restrict access to password files 0 2 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Store password hashes 0 4 ⇓
Encrypt passwords *4 7 ⇓
Don’t hardcode passwords 0 1 ⇓
Throttling
Throttle password guesses 0 8 ⇓
Transmitting passwords
Don’t transmit in cleartext 0 4 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Request over a protected channel 0 2 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Don’t allow users to paste passwords
⇓ Decreases the probability of attack. ⇑ Increases the probability of attack.
↑ Minorly increases the probability of attack. ↓ Minorly decreases the probability of attack.
, underline: advice is impossible to enforce; it must be followed voluntarily or in a certain way.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss the characteristics we discovered within the costs and benefits of security advice. We
begin with some general observations on our cost analysis in Table 2 and Table 3.
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6.1 Costs discussion
6.1.1 Breakdown of costs. We have two tables of advice. Table 2 shows the advice which is instructing users on best
practice. In this table the mode cost is user time and increased risk of forgetting. We notice that the user time costs
are often periodic. This means that these costs occur repeatedly for each user. The second table, Table 3, shows the
advice which dictates the actions of the organization and the security protocols and rules they should enforce. In the
organization-advice table we can see that most costs are in the categories organization time to enforce/implement and
increased organization computing power. However we also notice that most of the organization time costs are once off
costs.
Of our nine cost categories, 5 of them require increased human effort. We identified 212 costs resulting from the
79 advice statements we analysed. 72% of these 212 costs related to the 5 human-effort-categories. In fact, if we only
look at the major costs (ignoring minor and positive), 89% of the major costs fall into these 5 categories. Whether they
are humans working at enforcing the restrictions (system administrators or other) or users directed to follow certain
practices, there are significant additional costs placed on them as a result of authentication rules. Considering this, it is
unsurprising that there are conflicts between security practices and human actions [42].
6.1.2 Costly advice. In the user-advice-table the most expensive piece of advice seems to be “use multi-factor au-
thentication”. We will note later whether this is balanced by the benefits. “Keep anti-virus updated” and “never reuse
passwords” also seem quite costly. In the organization-advice-table it is more difficult to discern what the most costly
pieces of advice are. It likely includes “make digital and physical backups”, “change all default passwords”, “change
users’ passwords regularly”, “require a password for every account”, “monitor and analyze intrusions”, and “regularly
apply security patches”. These items may not be a surprise to those working in security operations. But it will be
interesting to compare this to the benefits of these advice statements.
6.1.3 Users versus organization costs. In our tables we have included a vertical double line. On the left-hand side of this
line we show costs which are felt by the organization. On the right-hand side we have costs which are placed on the
end-user. Of the 79 advice statements, 35 had costs for both the user and the organization, 28 had costs just for the user
and 16 had costs just for the organization. There are 114 (non-positive) user costs identified and 91 organization costs.
We looked at the breakdown of whether the costs felt were repeating or once off. Figure 2a shows how many costs of
each type there were for a user and for the organization. The distribution between advice types is similar for both users
and organizations. For both groups there are more one-time costs than any other type. The organization experiences
fewer major costs but has more minor costs than users. 47% of the organization costs are minor.
There are no positive costs for the organization. This could imply that advice hasmade attempts tomake authentication
usable for users, but it is not concerned with usability for organizations. Even for users, we only encountered 5 pieces
of advice with positive costs. This tells us that most advice is concerned with trying to improve security over usability.
The computing power cost we believe is relatively in-obtrusive. Even as a minor cost, the financial burden is very
small and the impact for users can go unnoticed. We believe a lot of the costs that the organization experiences seem to
be computing power costs, and therefore we are counting a larger strain on the organization than they really experience.
To investigate this, we plot the number of costs again but this time we ignore the computing power costs. This is shown
in Figure 2b. We can see that the organization has very few costs remaining while the user costs have remained largely
unchanged. This summarizes how much bigger an impact authentication advice has on end-users compared to the
organizations enforcing the policies.
Manuscript submitted to ACM
Costs and benefits of authentication advice 17
Organization costs
User costs
10
30
40
50
20
0
N
um
be
r o
f C
os
ts
Cost Type
(a) All costs categories
Organization costs
User costs
10
30
40
50
N
um
be
r o
f C
os
ts
 (e
xc
ep
t c
om
pu
tin
g 
po
w
er
)
20
0
Cost Type
(b) Without computing power cost category
Fig. 2. Number of major/minor and periodic, at login and once-off costs for user versus organization
6.2 Benefits discussion
Now we look at the benefits identified in Tables 5 and Table 6. Observe that overall, the advice does seem to decrease
the chance of compromise. This should be unsurprising as this is, after all, the aim of authentication policies. However,
there are some areas where there are increases in the chance of attacks. Eight advice statements have major negative
benefits and six pieces of advice have minor negative benefits. That is, in some areas, these pieces of advice can increase
the probability of compromise. The remaining 65 advice statements all show improvements for security.
6.2.1 Beneficial advice. The advice statement with the largest positive impact on security appears to be “one account
per user”. This offers decreases for 5 different attack types. The advice with the largest negative impact on security
seems to be “Enforce maximum [password] length”. We see people on chat forums complaining about this piece of
advice (e.g., [8]). The advice has no positive security value and serves to make password guessing easier for an attacker.
6.2.2 Attack protection. In the current model framework, it might not always be meaningful to compare the security
impact of one piece of advice against another. Take, for example, one piece of advice which decreases the probability
of compromise against one attack type, and a piece of advice that decreases the probability of compromise against
three attack types. It is likely that the latter piece of advice is “better” but in reality, different attacks occur with higher
frequency than others and therefore protecting against one attack which occurs regularly might be more effective than
protecting against three rare attack types. This leads us to an interesting question on the frequency with which the
different types of attacks are successful, and whether there is more advice against the more frequent attack types.
Phishing, for example, occurs continuously, from targeted spear phishing attacks to mass phishing emails [37].
Whereas side channel attacks, while they attract interest from researchers, appear to have small real-world chance of
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Fig. 3. Number of times advice effects each attack type (excluding minor increases and decreases)
occurring. We found that the attacks most protected against in our advice were online and offline guessing attacks. A
similar amount of advice tried to protect against phishing attacks as side channel attacks.
Figure 3 shows the number of times an attack was affected by a piece of advice. Green bars show the number of
times a piece of advice decreased the chance of this attack occurring. The red-boxed bars show the number of times a
piece of advice increased the chance of the given attack occurring.
Physical theft had the least amount of advice that helped protect against it and the most amount of advice that leads
to an increase in the chance of a physical theft. This is because of advice such as “use 2-step verification using a phone”
which introduces an additional physical object into the authentication procedure.
6.3 Costs versus benefits trade-off
We are interested in the trade-offs between the costs and the benefits. Is high-cost advice balanced by high benefits? Or
are we paying high usability costs for small increases to security?
6.3.1 Prioritising usability over security. Six advice statements had negative benefits only, i.e., they increase the
probability of compromise. Five pieces of advice had a positive cost; they increase usability. There was overlap between
four of these. That is, four pieces of advice had negative benefits but positive costs:
• Use a password manager,
• Write down safely,
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• Generated passwords must aid memory retention,
• Offer to display typed in passwords.
These pieces of advice could have prioritized usability over security.
6.3.2 Good, usable security advice. We found in our benefits discussion that “one account per user” offered many
security benefits. It has four costs (mostly partial) and three of these are borne by the organization. This, therefore,
offers a significant increase in security without placing major inconveniences on the user.
In our benefits analysis we found that “Enforce maximum [password] length” had no positive security value. We find
that it places one major costs on the user and two minor costs on the organization. This is an example of advice which
compromises usability for no increase in security. Unfortunately, this practice is still enforced by organizations. In 2007
Furnell assessed the policies of 10 different websites and 3 enforced maximum lengths on passwords: two limited the
length to 10 characters and one limited it at 16 [33]. In addition, we found that some websites only reveal their limit on
password length after the user has attempted to use a longer password [62].
“Change your password regularly” gives minor protection against offline and online guessing attacks. But it has 3
periodic costs and 1 one-time cost and therefore the benefits are unlikely to offset the costs. This is in line with the
results of Chiasson et al. [21].
The most expensive advice was “use multi-factor authentication”. But it does offer increase in security against online
guessing and phishing attacks, two of the most common attack types. Whether the benefits outweigh the costs will
likely depend on its implementation and the needs of the specific organization and users.
One very beneficial piece of advice appears to be: “encrypt password files”. This protects against three attack types
and most of the costs are borne by the organization rather than the user. Similarly, “Don’t perform truncation” has
no costs to the user and has large benefits. The costs and benefit between “preforming truncation” and setting a
“maximum password length” are similar. However, 3 places recommended setting a maximum password length but
nowhere recommended truncation. Truncation of course has the additional security flaw that the user is not aware of
the adaption, but the end product for both is a password with a set restriction on length.
“Don’t transmit in cleartext” and “Request over a protected channel” both protect against a number of attacks and
the only user costs are a minor increase in computing power.
The user piece of advice “Keep software updated” protects against three attack types but it incurs two periodic costs
to the user and one minor cost. In these cases, it is more difficult to determine at a glance whether the advice is cost
beneficial for the user.
In Table 7 we highlight the advice that we can determine is either good or bad. Reassuringly, these determinations
are very much in line with the NIST 2017 authentication guidelines [35]. In future work, we hope to include weightings
for the different attack types and for different costs. For example, mitigating online guessing attacks is more valuable
than mitigating side channel attacks, simply because online guessing attacks occur more often. Similarly increases in
computing power may have little relevance to one company but requiring users to secure extra resources could be
detrimental to that same organizations’ business. Therefore, we believe weightings which reflect the priorities of a
company would also be valuable and will be considered in future work. Placing weightings on the attack types and cost
categories would allow us to make more determinations on good versus bad advice.
Finally, we note that our “canary” worked. We included the advice “Don’t allow users to paste passwords” knowing
that it had been determined by the security community to have no security value [41] and our model distinguished it as
a piece of bad advice.
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Good, usable security advice
Email up-to-date and secure
Do not store hints
Create long random passwords when using a password manager
Don’t send password by email
Don’t give passwords over the phone
One account per user
Don’t perform truncation
Encrypt password files
Don’t transmit in cleartext
Request over a protected channel
Bad advice
Security answers difficult to guess
Enforce restrictions on characters
Manually type URLs
Enforce restrictions on characters used in username
Enforce maximum length (< 40)
Don’t allow users to paste passwords
Table 7. Clear determinations about some of the advice we analyzed
6.4 Summary remarks
For the 78 pieces of advice we collected, and the one piece of advice we added in, we identified the costs and benefits of
each one. We found that the burdens of authentication fall on the users more than the organization. We also notice that,
in general, the costs are human effort costs; both on the system administrators who must implement the authentication
policies, and on the user who must abide by them.
Most advice was concerned with protecting against online and offline guessing attacks. Keylogging and phishing or
pharming attacks are not mentioned as often, despite their prevalence. Most of the protection against offline guessing is
focused on improving password strength rather than back end-processes. This is one of the examples where the burden
is placed on the user rather than the organization.
We found that, in most cases, it is very difficult to distinguish whether the costs outweigh the benefits for security
advice. Most advice had some negative impact for users of the organization. This difficulty in assessing the trade-off
could evidence one of the reasons why users and organizations often follow advice which researchers have proven
ineffective.
Despite the research literature highlighting the importance of usable security [32][20][64], we found that of the 276
recommendations we collected, only 13 supported advice that aided the usability of authentication. We find that 20
years on from Sasse’s “Users are not the enemy” paper, organizations are still recommending policies that overload
users.
7 CONCLUSION
In our research we categorize and discuss currently circulated password recommendations given by security specialists,
multinational companies and public bodies. We find that the advice given by different organizations is contradictory
and often at odds with security and usability research findings. 41% of the 276 recommendations we collected were
contradicted by recommendations given by another organization.
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Using a taxonomy of 276 pieces of collected password advice we develop a model of costs and benefits of advice. We
identify the costs of authentication advice as the resources, human or otherwise, which are required for the advice
to be implemented. We define the benefits as the change in security risk. Both costs and benefits can be positive or
negative; advice can reduce the number of resources needed, and advice can increase or decrease the risk.
Applying the classification of costs and benefits to the collected advice we gain an insight into the security and
usability of current authentication recommendations. We find most of the advice places large burdens on humans, both
system administrators, and end-users. Over 70% of the costs we identified related to the need for additional human
labour or effort. We also find that a lot of the security advice focused on small improvements to security which resulted
in heavy costs.
But reassuringly we did collect some advice which can offer large security benefits for small usability constraints.
We also conclude that if an organization is willing to bear costs on themselves, they can significantly improve usability
for their end-users, and simultaneously increase their security. We find that the advice we identified as having good
trade-offs, is aligned with the recent NIST [35] security guidelines.
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A ADVICE: COSTS, BENEFITS AND CHARACTERISTICS
A.1 Administrator accounts
A.1.1 Not for everyday use. Though programs such as su and sudo help reduce the burden, the main cost is to the
privileged user who must switch between accounts for different tasks. Organization must have the resources to create
two accounts for the one user. It can be argued that the more times the authentication process is completed by the
user, the more times it is susceptible to compromise during entry or transmission. Therefore not logging into the
administrator account for everyday tasks decreases the chance of eavesdropping and side channel attacks.
A.1.2 Must have its own password. If users access the administrator privileges by typing the administrator password
via su then all privileged users must know the same password. This makes social engineering, phishing and endpoint
compromise more likely. In addition if multiple users are recording or sharing with others the same credentials then
they are more likely to be duplicated and fall into the hands of an attacker. Alternatively, there might be administrative
access via the user’s own password (e.g. via sudo) or a second administrative account/password corresponding to each
user with administrative privileges. All of these have associated security risks. In our table we have represented the
case where there is one administrator who must create a second password which allows them access to administrator
privileges.
A.1.3 Should have extra protection. This advice is so vague that it is impossible for us to determine what exact costs
are associated with it. We can assume that the organization will need to set these extra protections in place.
A.2 Backup password options
A.2.1 Email up-to-date and secure. Most organization cannot practically check that each user has kept their email
up-to-date and secure. For a compliant user, this is a continuous process and will cost the user their time. Email is used
for password reset links and often as the method that a generated password is passed to users. Therefore having a
secure email account can help against eavesdropping and can prevent unauthorized binding of a new password to a
users’ account through the form of an emailed password reset. Having an up-to-date and secure email system with a
working spam/malware filter can help to protect against phishing and pharming attacks and compromise of an endpoint
due to malware.
A.2.2 Security answers difficult to guess. Three organizations recommending the use of security questions. Schechter
et al. show that security questions can be very easily guessed and are also easily forgotten by users [65]. Schechter et al.
found that participants forgot 20% of their answers to their own security questions within six months. It is unlikely an
organization will be able to enforce this advice. Security answers which are difficult to guess will likely be difficult to
remember and will also take time for the user to create.
Blacklisting common passwords will likely improve security, this is something organizations can do. Schechter et al.
found that 13% of the answers to the security questions could be guesses by others from the same demographic.
A.2.3 Do not store hints. If hints were stolen then these hints could be used to facilitate online or offline guessing or to
aid a social engineering attack; for example, in the Adobe compromise [27]. An organization is unlikely to be able to
stop users from storing password hints. However they can opt to not provide the facility for it. We look at the costs
from the point of view that the user voluntarily follows the advice to not store a hint.
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A.3 Backup work
Digital and physical back ups can save an organization a large amount of hardship if a breach or ransom attack occurs.
It takes organization time, computing memory, and resources. Backups do not directly decrease the chance of an attack.
Having physical backups of work does mean that the potential for physical theft now exists.
A.4 Composition
Composition restrictions are regularly enforced by websites, but the advice given is not consistent from site to site.
Herley [39] hypothesizes that different websites may deliberately have policies which are restrictive to different degrees
as this can help ensure that users do not share passwords between sites. All the advice in this category used a small
amount of computing power to verify that the password meets the requirements.
A.4.1 Must include special characters. Seven sites instructed users to “include special characters” in their passwords,
but five sites placed restrictions on which special characters can be used. A frequent restriction on special characters
was “do not use spaces". However, one piece of advice stated the more direct “do not use special characters".
A.4.2 Don’t repeat characters. Not allowing the repetition of characters deters users from choosing passwords such as
“aaaaaaa" or “wwddcc". Depending on the strictness of the restriction it could eliminate words such as “bookkeeper" or
“goddessship". It could also cause some inconvenience for random password generators where the word “Sdt2htTtd65c8h”
could be rejected.
A.4.3 Enforce restrictions on characters. We collected twelve pieces of advice encouraging composition restrictions on
passwords and only one piece of advice against it. The source rejecting composition rules was the NIST 2017 password
guidelines. Abrams and Bulter find that Password policies that require a minimum character length and mandate the
use of specific character types may reduce the number of viable passwords by more than 60% [3]. Complex password
composition rules can make the resulting passwords more difficult to guess [47]. Though simply allowing only long
(greater than 16 characters) passwords has a similar effect on guessability and may not cause as much hardship for
users [47].
A.5 Default Passwords
Default passwords are used in IoT devices and WiFi equipment among other things. Manufacturers set a default
password, which an administrator is supposed to change during setup [28]. These default passwords are not secure as
they have been shared publicly and often the same logins are used for many, or all, of the devices manufactured by a
given company. Changing the default password takes time during the set up of the device but once done should not
need to be updated unless it is compromised.
A.6 Expiry
A.6.1 Store history to eliminate reuse . This advice aims to stop users cycling through previously used passwords.
Storing the history means there is an additional password file which needs to be protected. Because of the close
relationship between old and new passwords [80], if this file is revealed then the information in it can be used to
effectively guess the current password [24]. The organization must store all previous passwords, requiring memory.
The user will need to pick a new password as old passwords cannot be reused. At creation the server must query the
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stored dataset to verify the uniqueness of the new password. There is also an increased risk of forgetting as the user may
forget which passwords have been expired and which is the current password in use.
A.6.2 Change your password regularly. From anecdotal evidence we know the advice “change your password regularly”
is widely disliked by users [36]. Expiry costs are triggered periodically. The organization will need to update their stored
dataset of passwords at each update and notify users of the requirement to change their password. Research has shown
that the security benefits of expiry are minimal [21][80] but still 7 organizations recommend the practice. This implies
the inconvenience to users is worth less to organizations than the minimal security benefits. Or do organizations want
to be seen to be enforcing strong security practices, and forcing expiry is just one way of doing this?
A.6.3 Change if suspect compromise. Half the advice in the category was aimed at users and half was aimed towards
organizations. We chose to interpret it as if it is aimed towards an organization. The advice says that organization must
ensure users’ passwords are changed if a compromise is suspected. This advice inconveniences users not affected by
the compromise, and also those who are. If there is a breach at the server the users were not at fault yet still they must
choose a new password. The advice protects against online or offline guessing from an attacker who has access to the
compromised password.
A.7 Generated Passwords
A.7.1 Use a random bit generator & must aid memory retention. Random passwords are very difficult for users to
remember [81] but passwords that aid memory retention can potentially lead to easier guessability.
A.7.2 Must be issued immediately. This decreases the chance that generated passwords are stolen before they are told
to the user. If passwords were created in advance they would likely be recorded as administrators could not remember
multiple generated passwords. This, therefore protects against the potential duplicated while in storage. It takes users
time to be available to receive the newly created password. Takes administrator time to distribute.
A.7.3 Only valid for first login. Because these generated passwords are often issued and created by administrators
the user has no confidence in the security of their password up until the point they receive it. Maintaining a rule that
passwords must be changed at first login means that the user can now have complete control over the security of this
new password. This advice protects against previous duplication of the password.
A.7.4 Distribute in a sealed envelope. This increases the chance that the password is physically stolen as the enve-
lope could be taken. It can also be duplicated and placed in a new envelope. An observational, audible or network
eavesdropping attack is less likely.
A.8 Individual Accounts
A.8.1 One account per user. Having one account per user with a password is important for maintaining access controls
and also tracking errors or attacks back to a source account. Different users using the same device will need to switch
between their accounts, this logging in and out will cost the organization computing power and the user time. The
organization needs resources to create multiple accounts. The alternative is multiple users using the one account.
Compromises are more likely if there are multiple points of access.
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A.8.2 Each account password protected. If there is no password we can likely consider the account to already be in a
state of compromise. Password protecting an account increases the security of the account by necessitating one of the
attacks to take place before an attacker can gain access.
A.9 Input
A.9.1 Don’t performed truncation. Truncating passwords makes online and offline guessing easier. It can also affect
social engineering attacks. If the user does not know that the password will be truncated they may reveal the first
few characters of the password without realizing the true security extent of this action. There will be an increase in
computing power for hashing the additional characters and the user must now enter their entire password correctly
each time.
A.9.2 Accept all characters. The organization must create a system which has the ability to accept all characters in a
consistent way. This is a non trivial task. It will involve the standardization of Unicode characters entered from any
keyboard at each login. Accepting all characters reduces the likelihood that the policy will inconvenience a user’s
password choice. This increases the necessary search space of an attacker attempting online or offline guessing. Allowing
all characters could give more scope for a SQL injection attack, but the hope is that there would be adequate string
escaping in place to mitigate this.
A.10 Keep accounts safe
A.10.1 Implement Defense in Depth. This is a vague piece of advice, we do not know exactly what strategies would be
deployed so we cannot fully capture the costs and benefits. It has the potential to mitigate any of the eleven attack types,
but without knowing what is implemented we cannot say exactly what the security advantages or disadvantages are.
A.10.2 Implement Technical Defenses. The same argument as above can be used for this advice; it is not specific enough
for us to know it’s benefits. Though it is unlikely to aid against physical theft and social engineering.
A.10.3 Apply access control systems. This means that only the privileged administrators have the power to view and
control the authentication procedures and modify the stored authentication data. This protects against a malicious
employee “turning off” authentication or other security mechanics, duplicating the stored password dataset or down-
loading malware to attempt side channel or keylogging attacks. However, exactly what this advice protects against
depends on which specific access controls are put in place.
A.10.4 Monitor and analyze intrusions. Awareness of what an attacker is doing within the system and learning where
vulnerabilities are is important for security. However this advice has no direct security affect unless the analysis is
acted on. Monitoring and analyzing intrusions is a continuous job.
A.10.5 Regularly apply security patches. Involves periodic organization time. Different security patches will protect
against different attack types.
A.11 Keep your account safe
A.11.1 Check webpages for SSL. his task helps users verify that communications to this webpage will be transmitted
securely with encryption. This will help to combat phishing and pharming since phishing and pharming sites usually
do not use SSL encryption. However, Dhamija et al. found that 23% of their participants did not look at browser-based
Manuscript submitted to ACM
28 Hazel Murray and David Malone
cues such as the address bar, status bar or security indicators [25] and Schechter et al found that 53% of their study
participants attempted to log into a site after they received a strong security warning [66]. This advice is not enforceable.
A.11.2 Manually type URLs. Manually typing URLs can save a user from a Phishing attack as the user should recognize
that the URL is not linking to the correct website. However, manually typing URLs makes a user vulnerable to typo-
squatting/URL hijacking [73]. A site with a similar URL, e.g. www.goggle.com, masquerades as the website of the user’s
intended destination and can trick a user into revealing their login details. Manually typing URLs can be very time
consuming for users.
A.11.3 Don’t open emails from strangers. In certain jobs it can be impossible to not open email from strangers and
even in everyday life it can be very inconvenient. However, a 2012 study by Böhme and Moore found that as a result of
concerns over cyber crime 42% of participants say they do not open email from strangers [11]. We only collected one
piece of advice which said not to open emails from strangers.
A.11.4 Keep software updated. Vaniea and Rashidi found that 49.3% of respondents relayed negative experiences with
software updates. Keeping software updated protects against known security vulnerabilities. This can save a user from
eavesdropping attacks, side channel attacks and endpoint compromise.
A.11.5 Keep antivirus updated. Keeping antivirus updated is a periodic process for the user. It has the added disadvantage
that the antivirus may also need to be repurchased regularly. Antivirus protected the user’s machine from compromise.
A.11.6 Log out of public computers. Not logging out of a public computer can lead to a lot of damage. An opportunistic
attacker could spend money with linked credit cards, masquerade as the user, ask for money to be transferred by
the user’s peers, and set up backdoor access into the account for future use, among other things. We could find little
evidence of reported breaches. It is unclear whether this is because it does not occur or whether victims don’t reveal or
don’t know that this as the reason for their breach.
A.11.7 Password protect your phone. Nowadays users can conduct most online transactions via mobile phones. Their
portability makes them susceptible to theft. Also users are more likely to leave themselves continuously logged on to
applications. Password protecting your phone reduces the chance of endpoint compromise.
A.12 Length
A.12.1 Enforce a minimum password length. Enforcing a minimum length inconveniences memorability and may force
users to alter or change their password. If our aim is to minimize password reuse, then this might not necessarily
be a draw back [39]. A minimum length will restrict the use of zero or one character passwords. Most of the advice
encouraged the minimum length to be set at eight characters, likely as a protection against GPU-based guessing.
A.12.2 Enforce maximum password length. Three pieces of advice recommended enforcing a maximum password
length: 15 characters [43], 20 characters [62] and 40 characters [44]. Interestingly, one company [62] did not list a
maximum password strength as one of their restrictions. Only when a user attempts to enter their password is the
restriction revealed. NIST 2017 guidelines [35] state that “Verifiers should permit subscriber-chosen memorized secrets
at least 64 characters in length". Restricting the length of a password inconveniences personal systems for password
generation, restricts the outputs of a random password generator, and introduces an upper bound on the attacker’s
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search space. It also makes passwords easier for an eavesdropper to record as they are less likely to cross packet
boundaries.
A.13 Multi-factor authentication
A.13.1 Use multi-factor authentication. Multi-factor authentication traditionally involves: something you are, something
you know, and something you have, e.g., fingerprint, password and a USB key token respectively. Using something
you have means that the user or organization may need to purchase an additional resource and the user may need
to carry an additional item. In addition, this item (unlike something you know or something you are) is susceptible to
theft and loss. Though, if theft does occur the user is still nearly as secure as if the second factor had never been used.
Additional user time is needed to complete the authentication process since multiple factors are needed at each login.
Using multi-factor authentication can decrease the success of phishing (as second factors are often not subject to replay)
and online guessing attacks (as both factors must be guessed).
A.13.2 Use 2 step verification on phone. Two step verification is different to multi-factor authentication as the two
steps could use the same factor. Phones can be stolen or the code sent to the phone can be revealed by eavesdropping
or a side channel attack. However if this occurs, depending on the chosen second step, the users’ account could still be
secure.
A.13.3 Use for remote accounts. Remote accounts are often more vulnerable as the user might need to connect over an
insecure channel. Depending on what the second factor is, physical theft or endpoint compromise could jeopardize the
authentication. The probability the exchange is eavesdropped is much higher if used for remote accounts.
A.14 Network: Community Strings
A community string is a user ID or password that is sent along with an SNMP request [38]. A community string is a
password for access to statistics within a device or router. Someone can access data from such devices if they know the
correct community string.
A.14.1 Don’t define as standard default. The standard default for community strings is set by the vendor. Vendors can
choose the same password for all their devices and can have defaults passwords as simple as ‘public’ [45]. These defaults
are generally easily guessed. The community strings allow an attacker to find out about a organization’s network and
potentially find access points.
A.14.2 Different to login password. Often community strings are not encrypted. Because they are transmitted in
cleartext they can be read by anyone. This is an issue if the password sent is reused for other applications. A new string
will need to be created but they are stored in configuration files and do not need to be memorized.
A.15 Password cracking
A.15.1 Attempt to crack passwords. By requiring users to change their password if it is guessed by an administrator the
hope is that a stronger password will then be chosen by the user. This is a common policy for organizations [48][79],
yet only one piece of advice we collected recommended it. We speculate whether organizations are unwilling to openly
admit and recommend this practice. The cracking must be repeated periodically by the organization, meaning the
password may need to be changed periodically by users.
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A.16 Password managers
A.16.1 Use a password manager. If we assume the norm is for users to memorize their passwords, then a password
manager does not, in its own right, offer additional security. It does greatly reduce the users’ memory load and by
extension then a user can use as long, random and complex of a password as they wish. Thus this act will increase
security but just using the password manager does not guarantee users will increase the complexity of their passwords.
A password manager does mean that the user is relying on an external agent to store their passwords and therefore if
this agent is compromised then the passwords of all accounts are compromised. Therefore, we consider this to be a new
way in which the users’ password can be duplicated. A password manager requires additional resources for the user as
the user may need to purchase and/or download and maintain a password manager.
A.16.2 Create long random passwords. One of the advantages of a password manager is that, because a user no longer
needs to recall their passwords, the password can be as long and complex as a user wishes [31]. Creating long and
random passwords takes computing time and the user may need to specially configure the password manager. An
organization specifying the type of password that should be created will inconvenience the users’ personal system for
password generation. If the password created is different to the users’ general structure and is random, the user may
never be able to remember it. This is only an issue if the password manager fails, the master password is forgotten or
the user needs to access the account from a device not linked to the password manager.
A.17 Personal information
A.17.1 Don’t include personal information. This is a difficult thing for an organization to enforce. In fact, there is
no reasonable way for an organization to eliminate all personal information from passwords. Some basic form of
cross checking between user information could be done. For example, at the client end it could be possible to sweep
the information on a device to ensure it is not included. Doing this has high organization and user end computing
costs as well as privacy/GDPR implications. It also has the potential to inconvenience the users’ personal system for
password generation. There is also an Increased risk of forgetting as personal details could have made the password
more memorable. If the advice is followed it would protect against a targeted attack. Castelluccia et al., find they can
crack 5% more passwords by leveraging personal information about users [17] and Li et al. discover that just over 60%
of passwords in their study of a Chinese password dataset contain at least one piece of personal information [53].
A.17.2 Must not match account details. An increase in computing power is needed to cross check the password against
the user’s information. The advice is enforceable and protects against elementary targeted attacks. A simple form of
this are ‘Joe accounts’ where the username and password match [1]. In 1989, Bishop and Klein cracked 40% of 14,000
UNIX accounts using guesses derived from associated usernames or account numbers and dictionaries [10].
A.17.3 Do not include names. We consider a ban on names to be capable of eliminating a significant number of options
for users’ passwords and may make them more difficult to remember. In addition, words which double as names could
be eliminated, “Bob", “Amber", “Jack", as a result of this restriction.
A.18 Personal password storage
A.18.1 Don’t leave in plain sight. If the users are internal to the organization then it could be possible for the organization
to monitor work areas. However in many situations it will be impossible. If the user follows the advice they have two
options. They can memorize the password in which case there is a chance it is forgotten. Or they can store it in a hidden
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location which will require extra user effort or time to retrieve. This cost will take effect at every login as the user will
need to check the password each time.
A.18.2 Don’t store in a computer file. This advice is difficult or impossible for an organization to enforce. An attacker
accessing the file can duplicate passwords.
A.18.3 Write down safely. Even if the password is stored safely, the very act of writing it down makes it’s duplication
and physical theft possible. There is discussion as to whether the security risks of writing passwords are in fact very
low [52]. In fact, if users write down passwords then they may be more confident making stronger password choices
[19][49][39]. Users will have to take the time to look-up the password when they need to enter it. Shay et al., find that
users are more likely to share and reuse their passwords than write them down [69].
A.18.4 Don’t choose “remember me”. If the “remember me” option is not used then if an attacker steals a laptop or
computer they should not automatically have access to the accounts on it. It is equivalent to not logging out of an
account. The user will now need to remember their password instead of it being saved in the browser. In additio,n at
each login the user will need to physically type their password.
A.19 Phrases
A.19.1 Blacklist common passwords & Don’t use patterns & Don’t use words & Don’t use published phrases. Needing to
Blacklist common words or remove all patterns during password creation could be computationally expensive for the
organization if the list becomes very large. There exists a PAM module called ‘cracklib’ which automates blacklisting
[56]. From leaked password database we know users primarily choose words and pattern based passwords [76]. Shay et
al. find that the “use of dictionary words and names are still the most common strategies for creating passwords" [69].
This depicts how ineffective some password advice can be and is possibly a reflection on the costs appearing to not
outweigh the benefits from a users’ point of view.
A.19.2 Substitute symbols for letters. We know from Warner [75] that passwords with simple character substitutions
can be weak. Yet, 2 of 3 pieces of advice recommend it. This could stem from the attitude that it is ‘better than nothing’.
A.19.3 Insert random numbers and symbols & Take initials of a phrase. Unless an organization automates password
generation, it is difficult to enforce. Taking initials of a phrase can make a password appear like a random string.
A.20 Policies
A.20.1 Establish clear policies. A lot of the advice we have collected is contradictory. Including the advice from the
two organizations who gave this advice! This advice does not directly increase or decrease the probability of success of
an attack type.
A.21 Reuse
A.21.1 Never reuse a password. Users must create a new password each time they open an account. It is very hard to
enforce a no reuse policy across organizations. Das et al. estimate that 43-51% of users reuse passwords across sites [24].
If passwords are reused then online and offline guessing becomes much easier for an attacker.
A.21.2 Don’t reuse certain passwords. Asking users to not reuse certain passwords is equivalent to saying that a user
can reuse some passwords. Florêncio, Herley and Van Oorschot [31] declare that, “password re-use is a necessary
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and sensible tool in managing a portfolio” of credentials. They recommend grouping passwords according to their
importance and reusing passwords only within those groups. If we look at the specific advice in this category, we see that
most organizations are asking users to not reuse the password for their site. This does provide some security advantage
for that specific site. The attacker will not be able to directly access the protected account using a compromised password
from another source. However, an attacker can leverage information from other compromised sites to attempt phishing,
social engineering and guessing attacks with more success.
A.21.3 Alter and reuse passwords. Das et al. [24] were able to guess approximately 10% of non-identical password pairs
in less than 10 attempts and approximately 30% in less than 100 attempts. Therefore, we mark this as a limited security
improvement. We could find no research suggesting this method of altering and reusing passwords as effective, though
anecdotally it is common [72]. Specifying the structure that passwords should take could partially affect users’ personal
system for password generation.
A.22 Sharing
A.22.1 Never share your password & Don’t send passwords by email & Don’t give passwords over phone. Weirich and
Sasse find that sharing your password is regarded as a gesture of trust and refusing to share your password with
someone is an indication that you do not trust them [77]. A 2011 study of 122 people found that one third of respondents
reported sharing their personal email password, a quarter shared their Facebook password and approximately 20% of
people who had work email passwords reported sharing them with colleagues [46]. However, Kaye finds that thought
and consideration was given before the password was shared. This tells us that the user is aware of the security risks and
may accept them on the ground of trust. In the process of sharing a password it could be eavesdropped. Not allowing
users to share their passwords also helps to protect against social engineering, though this is through the form of user
education.
A.23 Shoulder surfing
A.23.1 Offer to display password. A visual image of the passwords could help users with the memorization of their
password or aid users with difficulty typing. Nielsen in 2009 challenged ever masking passwords [60]. Bruce Schneier,
after originally agreeing with the removal of masking, here [67] sums up why password masking needs to continue in
certain contexts.
A.23.2 Enter your password discretely. This advice is unenforceable. But Florêncio, Herley and Coskun suspect that
shoulder surfing attacks are not very common as humans are very good at detecting people in their personal space [30].
Eiband et al. find that shoulder surfing mainly occurs in an opportunistic, non-malicious way and it is usually personal
data that is observed [26]. When a user is logging in it may take some extra time or inconvenience for them to verify
that they are entering their password discretely.
A.24 Storage
A.24.1 Encrypt passwords file. This is the encryption, usually with a password as the key, of the file containing all the
passwords. Encrypting this file means that when any user wishes to log in, the whole file is decrypted, the password is
compared to the value entered by the user, and then the file is encrypted again. Encrypting the individual password
values is different and is discussed below. Encryption and decryption may slow down the authentication process for
the user. For the organization, at each system start up the password needs to be provided. This can be done manually,
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which would require periodic organization time. Or it could be automated in which case the password is accessible to
the computer system, which would bear security risks, by reducing the effective secrecy provided by the encryption.
A.24.2 Restrict access to password files. The advice in this category recommended encrypting the file the passwords
are stored in and restricting access to those files. An example of this in practice is Unix’s /etc/shadow file versus the
/etc/password file. Access controls are implemented in Unix and Linux machine and result in a secure out of the box
authentication protocol.
A.24.3 Store password hashes. A cryptographic hash is a bit string of a fixed size which should uniquely represent a
password. It is irreversible but is deterministic i.e. the same password will always map to the same hash. An attacker
can discover the passwords by creating a large look up table (rainbow tables) which matches each password to a
corresponding hash value. This is very effective for passwords up to a certain length and after this point a brute force
search is still possible. If the hash of the password is stored, then if the user forgets their password, the password cannot
be recovered from the hash. Therefore the user will need to create a new password.
Two pieces of advice recommending hashes also recommended using a salt. The salt randomizes the output of the
password hash, making the use of rainbow tables impossible. An offline guessing attack is necessary for revealing the
passwords. One piece of advice relating to salting said to use “a unique salt for each account”. The second piece did not
specify whether the same salt could be used for all accounts of whether a unique salt was to be used. If the same salt is
used then a look up table is still a feasible attack. Not specifying the use of a salt might be a careless use of terminology,
but a 2019 paper by Ntantogian et al. found that 14.29% of Content Management Services surveyed did not use a salt in
their default hashing scheme [61].
A.24.4 Encrypt passwords. Encryption of passwords was the first common method recommended as a means of
protecting passwords [55]. However it is often reversible and a key needs to be protected for security to be maintained.
It is now recommended that the hashing and salting method is used for password storage. Despite this, seven pieces of
advice recommended password encryption, in comparison to only four pieces of advice recommending hashing and
only two recommending hashing and salting. N
In the case of a password leak, either the key is revealed along with the password database or it is not. If the key
is revealed all passwords are immediately decryptable. If the key is not revealed then brute force guessing can be
attempted against the key, but this is a difficult task. In the adobe breach, for example, though most passwords were
compromised by guessing the key was never discovered [40].
A.24.5 Don’t hardcoding passwords. Hardcoding passwords will make is very difficult to automate changes making it a
less usable method. Hardcoding will also make passwords less secure since they may be stored in plaintext to a file that
an administrator can directly edit.
A.25 Throttling
A.25.1 Throttle password guesses. Throttling involves limiting the number of wrong guesses that can be made against
an account. However, because of the right-skewed nature of password distribution, the attacker does still have a high
probability of success with a small number of guesses [54][59]. The cost of this is that a legitimate user could accidentally
be locked out if they mistype or forget their password a certain number of times. For example, Brostoff and Sasse [15]
find that with a three strike system 31% of users are unfairly locked out.
Manuscript submitted to ACM
34 Hazel Murray and David Malone
A.26 Transmitting passwords
A.26.1 Don’t transmit in cleartext & Request over a protected channel. These are very similar pieces of advice since both
groupings place the onus on the organization to oversee that passwords are sent by protected channels. If passwords
are transmitted in cleartext they are susceptible to any eavesdropper on the network. Let’s Encrypt has helped to make
security certificates accessible to more websites [2]. However providing a secure channel for passwords is not an easy
task. In a 2017 2-hour lab study, 18.5% of educated participants failed to set up a secure HTTPS connection [50].
A.27 Username
A.27.1 Enforce composition restrictions on usernames. Florêncio, Herley and Coskun argue that it is better to increase
the strength of the userID rather than the passwords [30]. They propose that this will protect against online guessing
attacks but will not majorly increase the cost to users since the username can be recorded visibly.
A.27.2 Don’t reuse username. If the same username is used for multiple accounts then once the password for one
account is compromised, this password can be tried against the same person’s other accounts. Das et al. find that 43-51%,
of users directly re-use passwords between sites and many others introduce small modifications to their passwords
across sites [24]. Not reusing a username could be one way to protect against an attacker leveraging this vulnerability
and could be less burdensome on the user than a restriction on altering and reusing passwords. However, many sites
require an email address as a username and it is not reasonable to prohibit reuse of an email address.
A.28 Don’t allow users to paste passwords
We manually added this advice to our collection because, though we did not collect it, there is a tradition of not allowing
users to paste passwords. There is no clear evidence for the origin of this advice and users often questions why they are
not allowed to paste their passwords into the password field [41]. This advice has 4 different costs: the organization
must implement it, the user must take the extra time to manually type the password, many password managers cannot
function without pasting, users are at a much higher risk of typos, and a user may need to choose a much shorter
password if they cannot simply paste it efficiently into the web-form at login. Also, often the user has already created
their password before this rule is revealed. There appears to be no security benefits to this advice [7] and indeed in our
model we cannot find any attack type that it mitigates.
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